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Seeking to have Banks Sing to the Same
Tune: the Basel Committee Addresses
Credit Risk–Weighted Assets
O. Jean Strickland*
The objective of this Comment is to provide a critical assessment
of the recent debate about the Basel Committee for Banking
Standards’ (“BCBS”) reforms to risk–weighted assets (“RWA”)
calculations used to measure credit risk and to establish
international standards for bank capital requirements. After
introducing the interests and objectives of both the regulators and
the banking industry relative to this issue, the second part of this
Comment will cover the origins of the approaches to the
calculation of RWAs for regulatory capital requirement purposes.
Using loans as the focus of the analysis, the third part of this
Comment will examine the types of issues involved in standardized
versus internal bank model based approaches to RWA
calculations. It will include a description of the variability
presently occurring in the RWA calculations for loans and will
offer explanations as to whether the variations are justified.
Following this, the Comment will examine alternatives to the
BCBS’ proposed calculations of RWAs for loans. The conclusion
will appraise possible approaches to RWA calculations for loans
in light of technology’s continued evolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“At the aggregate level, credit risk accounts for on average three
quarters of a bank’s minimum capital requirements.”1
Heads of state, bankers, and regulators worldwide continue to debate
reforms to the international standards for determining bank capital
requirements. These reforms will significantly change risk–weighted
assets’ (“RWA”) calculation, which is used to measure credit risk.2
Working on the reforms,3 the Basel Committee members are particularly
1

William Coen, Sec’y Gen., Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Remarks at the Panel Discussion at the 2016 Annual Membership Meeting of
the Institute of International Finance (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.bis.org/speeches/
sp161007.htm (explaining reforms planned by the end of 2016 for banks’ regulatory capital
standards); see generally Briefing: Upgrading the Basel Standards: From Basel III to Basel
IV?, at 4 n.1, PE 587.361 (Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Briefing 2017] (explaining that credit
risk is the “probability that the bank does not recover the entirety of interests and
principal”).
2
See supra Coen, note 1; see also Boris Groendahl, Global Bank Regulator Holds Line
Against Europe on Capital Rules, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-07/global-bank-regulator-holds-line-againsteurope-on-capital-rules.
3
See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Basel Committee membership, BANK FOR
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/press/p160324.htm (last updated Mar.
24, 2016) (listing members of the committee in the About the Basel Committee section of
the website); see Basel Comm. for Bank Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements,
Implementation of Basel Standards: A Report to G20 Leaders on Implementation of The
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concerned with the current variability in banks’ calculations and the
deleterious effect this variability has on the credibility of international
bank capital adequacy standards.4 Bankers generally, on the other hand,
want maximum flexibility for creating their own models to measure credit
risk and they want to ensure that reformed RWA calculations do not
increase their capital requirements beyond present levels.5
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (“BCBS”) primary
purpose is to promote financial stability.6 Secondly, it sought to create a
level playing field” for internationally–active banks.7 However, following
the financial crisis at the end of 2007,8 “U.S. financial regulators in July
2013 attempted to impose capital standards slightly more stringent than
Basel III Regulatory Reforms 5 (Aug. 2016), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d377.pdf
(noting broad impact because of non–Basel Committee member jurisdictions’ increasing
adoption—about 70 such jurisdictions intend to have final rules on key elements of Basel
III by 2018).
4
See Boris Groendahl & Alessandra Migliaccio, Europe Said to Threaten Revolt over
Bank Capital–Rule Revamp, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.
com/professional/blog/europe-said-threaten-revolt-bank-capital-rule-revamp/ (“William
Coen, secretary general of the Basel Committee, told reporters, . . . ‘We’re doing this work
to reduce risk–weighted asset variability. And why are we doing that? To restore
confidence in the risk–weighted capital ratios and to fully restore credibility to the capital
adequacy framework.’”).
5
See id.; see, e.g., Letter from Darren Hannah, Vice–President, Finance, Risk &
Prudential Policy, Canadian Bankers Ass’n, to Secretariat, Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, at 1 (June 23, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from
Canadian Bankers Ass’n], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/canadian
bankers.pdf (“We highlight the importance of evaluating all of the many proposed
regulatory changes holistically to ensure that the Committee’s objective of not significantly
increasing overall capital requirements is met.”).
6
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision Charter art. I ¶ 1, http://www.
bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm; see also Maziar Peihani, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision: A Post–Crisis Analysis of Governance and Legitimacy 7 (December 2014)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of British Columbia), https://
open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/24/items/1.0077783 (“[T]he BCBS,
which has been central to the global governance regime of banking[,] . . . is the oldest and
best–known global regulatory forum, and the primary global prudential standard setter.”).
7
Secretariat of the Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements,
The New Basel Capital Accord: An Explanatory Note (Jan. 2001),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca01.pdf (“The two principal purposes of the [Basel] Accord
were to ensure an adequate level of capital in the international banking system and to create
a ‘more level playing field’ in competitive terms so that banks could no longer build
business volume without adequate capital backing.”); see also Linda Allen, The Basel
Capital Accords and International Mortgage Markets: A Survey of the Literature, 13
FIN. MKT., INSTS. AND INSTRUMENTS 41, 48 (2004) (“One of the goals of Basel I was to
‘level the playing field’ and lift Japanese banks’ capital levels from their comparatively
low levels in the pre–Basel period”).
8
Jeffry Frieden, The Governance of International Finance, 19 ANN. REV. OF POL. SCI.
33, 34 (2016), http://www.annualreviews.org.access.library.miami.edu/doi/pdf/10.1146/
annurev-polisci-053014-031647.
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those of Basel III, thus improving regulatory safeguards but undermining
the Basel premise of a level playing field for banks based in different
countries.”9 Other countries saw the U.S. as leading the charge for higher
capital standards for global banks through “a one–size–fits–all”
standardized approach versus allowing banks to determine their own
capital levels using internal models.10 Then Federal Reserve governor,
Daniel Tarullo, even expressly stated a desire for all Basel Committee
countries to implement standardized risk–weighted measurements for all
internationally active banks.11 The current Trump administration,
however, has moved to ease the regulatory burden on financial institutions
operating in the U.S.,12 while some financial regulators and academics are
9

Robert Kuttner, Demos, Global Governance of Capital: A Challenge for Democracy,
DEMOS 40 (Aug. 2014), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Global
Governance-Kuttner_0.pdf; see also Takako Taniguchi et al., Bank–Capital Battle Makes
Japan, EU Allies Against U.S. Push, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2016, 4:05 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-26/bank-capital-fight-makes-japan-euallies-against-u-s-clampdown (“The U.S. moved faster than the rest of the world after the
2008 crisis to revamp banking oversight, often seeking stricter standards than global
minimums set by the Basel Committee.”).
10
Taniguchi, supra note 9; but see Patrick Henry, U.S. Regulators Hang Tough at Basel
as Trump Rollback Looms, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2017, 4:05 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-27/u-s-bank-regulators-hang-tough-at-baselas-trump-rollback-looms (“Trump has vowed to roll back financial regulation, and . . .
there is concern that U.S. commitment to global banking standards may dwindle on his
watch.”).
11
Daniel Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Rethinking the
Aims of Prudential Regulation, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank
Structure Conference 15 (May 8, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/tarullo20140508a.pdf (“It would be best if all the Basel Committee countries
moved together to adopt standardized risk–weighted and supervisory stress testing
requirements for all internationally active banks.”); but see Ryan Tracy, Meet Randal
Quarles, Trump’s Pick to Shake Up the Fed, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/
articles/meet-randal-quarles-trumps-pick-to-shake-up-the-fed-1501234201 (last updated
July 28, 2017, 8:36 PM) (reporting that, as an expected replacement to Mr. Tarullo, who
left in April 2017, “Mr. Quarles . . . said he would review rules about banks’ capital
levels”).
12
See Exec. Order No. 13772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017) (identifying as core
principles, inter alia, “foster[ing] economic growth and vibrant financial markets through
more rigorous regulatory impact analysis that addresses systemic risk and market failures,
such as moral hazard and information asymmetry,” “advanc[ing] American interests in
international financial regulatory negotiations and meetings,” and ordering the Dep’t of the
Treas. to report on how laws and policies promote the Core Principles); see also DEP’T OF
THE TREAS., A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND
CREDIT UNIONS 6–7, 13 (June 2017) (responding to Exec. Order No. 13772 and arguing
for changes to ease financial institution regulatory burdens and increase lending so as to
promote economic growth while ensuring financial stability, in part, by “recalibrating
capital requirements that place an undue burden on individual loan asset classes,
particularly for mid–sized and community financial institutions”).
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sounding an alarm,13 leaving uncertain where U.S. capital calculations and
requirements will ultimately fall relative to Basel III.14 On the other hand,
European Union (“EU”) banks, representing nearly half of the world’s
biggest banks, strongly oppose restrictions on the use of models to
measure risk because they fear a more standardized approach will
disproportionately increase their capital requirements.15 The current
protests to the Basel Committee’s recommendations signals the potential
for “a fracturing of the hard–won coordination of regulation in the wake
of the financial crisis.”16
This Comment will examine relevant arguments for and against
internal model–based approaches to calculating credit RWAs using loans
as a proxy for examples of the challenges inherent in their use. Part II will
explain the evolution of approaches to the calculation of RWAs for loan
categories, which are used to establish regulatory capital requirements.
Part III will describe examples of the variability occurring in the RWA
13
Geoffrey Smith, Rolling Back Banking Regulations “Very Dangerous,” Says Fed
Vice Chairman, FORTUNE (Aug. 16, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/16/dodd-frankrollback-dangerous-short-sighted-fed/ (“Federal Reserve Vice Chair Stanley Fischer has
sounded the alarm at Republican plans to roll back regulations for the country’s largest
banks . . . [stating] ‘I am worried that the U.S. political system may be taking us in a
direction that is very dangerous.’”); see also Stephen Cecchetti & Kim Schoenholtz, The
US Treasury’s Missed Opportunity, VOX: CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL (July 14, 2017),
http://voxeu.org/article/us-treasury-s-missed-opportunity (“[A]t least when considering
the largest banks, our conclusion is that adopting the Treasury’s recommendations would
make the financial system less safe. And, it would do so with little prospect for boosting
economic growth. At times, the proposals read more like a financial industry wish–list than
a desirable and impartial balancing of the country’s needs for both a vibrant and resilient
financial system.”).
14
See e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREAS., supra note 12, at 12, 16 (“[F]urther emphasis should
be given to the use of standardized approaches over advanced approaches for risk–
weighting assets to simplify the capital regime[,] . . . [and] banking agencies [should]
carefully consider the implications for U.S. credit intermediation and systemic risk from
the implementation in the United States of a revised standardized approach for credit risk
under the Basel III capital framework[, and] U.S. regulators should provide clarity on how
the U.S.–specific adoption of any new Basel standards will affect capital requirements and
risk–weighted asset calculations for U.S. firms.”).
15
Boris Groendahl, EU Escalates Standoff with U.S. on Global Bank Capital Rules,
BLOOMBERG (Updated Sept. 23, 2016, 10:56 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-09-23/eu-opposes-key-plank-of-basel-s-global-bank-capital-rule-revamp
(observing also that the EU is home to nearly half of the world’s biggest banks); see also
Clive Briault, Basel Delay, KPMG: INSIGHTS (Jan. 23, 2017), https://home.
kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2017/01/basel-delay-fs.html (“[T]he concern among EU
banking supervisors [has been] that constraints on banks’ use of internal models to
calculate capital requirements would have a disproportionately negative impact on
European banks. European banks hold proportionately more assets – such as mortgage
lending – on their balance sheets, for which the use of internal models produces a marked
benefit compared with the application of standardised risk weightings.”).
16
Groendahl, supra note 15.
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calculations for loans presently and will review whether the variability is
justified. Part IV will examine alternative proposals for improving banks’
financial stability, including the feasibility of including other factors, and
additional granularity, in the calculation of RWAs for loans. Part V will
offer concluding thoughts considering advancements in technology.

II. EVOLUTION OF CREDIT RWA CALCULATIONS
“[C]oordinated international action was needed to prevent future
crises from spilling over borders.”17
As interconnectedness between national economies increased,
financial regulators in developed countries recognized that an individual
bank failure could have significant “systemic and financial stability
implications” across nations.18 Thus, the BCBS emerged as a global
standard–setting body for banking supervision and prudential regulation.19
The BCBS created the Basel Accords, which provide for home country
banking supervisors of internationally–active banks in their jurisdiction to
oversee implementation of the capital standards framework for these
banking groups on a consolidated basis.20 Host country supervisors also
have a role and “are responsible for supervision of those entities operating
in their countries.”21 For efficiency and avoidance of regulatory arbitrage,
host country supervisors may accept the group level capital standards work
17

Ranjit Lall, Why Basel II Failed and Why Any Basel III is Doomed 3 (Univ. of Oxford
Glob. Econ. Governance Programme, Working Paper No. 2009/52, 2009), http://
www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/sites/geg/files/Lall_GEG%20WP%202009_52.pdf;
see also Peihani, supra note 6 (arguing that BCBS’ evolution has been driven by “the
serious risks posed by profit–seeking practices” necessitating collaboration among those
who regulate banks and financial institutions. The banks do not collaborate directly to
create their regulatory framework.).
18
Caroline Bradley, Financial Stability, Regulation and Politics: Risks, Uncertainties
and the International Financial System 6–7 (Aug. 24, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author); Lall, supra note 17, at 4–6.
19
Melissa Boey, Regulating “Bankerspace”: Challenging the Legitimacy of the Basel
Accords as Soft Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 74, 75–76, 87–88 (2014) (“The
committee consists of ‘[s]enior officials responsible for banking supervision or financial
stability issues in central banks,’ or equivalent authorities with the formal responsibility of
supervising banking in various nations worldwide . . . . By design, the BCBS is a ‘small,
homogeneous, and insular’ club, meant to be able to reach agreement quickly and flexibly,
and shielded against political, executive, and legislative forces.”).
20
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework
Comprehensive Version 219 (June 2006) [hereinafter International Convergence],
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.
21
Id.
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of an internationally–active bank operating at the local level.22 Home
country supervisors lead the coordination of the respective roles of the
home country and host country supervisors.23
While Basel I, which targeted internationally–active banks, was an
initial effort by central bankers in the most developed countries to establish
comparable and equivalent bank capital standards, jurisdictions of all sizes
and standing across the globe, adopted the standards.24 Thus, with far–
reaching impact, Basel I set minimum capital requirements at only 8% of
risk–weighted assets,25 without empirical studies or other support for the
adequacy of the 8% level.26
Nonetheless, employing the 8% standard, Basel I’s standardized
approach for calculating risk–weighted assets assigned loans to one of four
broad categories of risk such as: (1) Cash, loans to governments in
specified countries–0%, (2) Loans to banks in specified countries–20%,
(3) Residential mortgages–50%, (4) Corporate and consumer loans–
100%.27 Under this approach, banks totaled the weighted assets and
multiplied the total by the 8% floor to determine their minimum capital
requirement.28 With only four broad categories for assets, critics argued

22

Id.
Id.; see also Boey, supra note 19, at 78 (“[T]he focus on accountability and democratic
legitimacy ought to be shifted from the international level back to the domestic, before
each nation state adopts the Basel Accord into binding law. In this manner, soft law will
permit the necessary coordination and cooperation in a rapidly developing and politically
contentious realm by experts best placed to resolve such issues, while ensuring that no
binding legal strength or ‘bite’ is granted until it has gone through the necessary
constitutional and democratic review processes, as per each jurisdiction’s lawmaking
processes.”).
24
CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A HISTORY
OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1997, at 556 (2011).
25
Lall, supra note 17, at 5; see also Risk Weighted Assets: DIY Capital, THE ECONOMIST
(Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21567958edifice-modern-bank-regulation-comes-under-scrutiny-diy-capital (reporting that Basel II
adopted the idea of risk–weighted assets so that banks with the most creditworthy
borrowers could set aside less capital than peers taking greater risks and illustrating with
the example that a residential mortgage considered ten times safer than a person loan would
only require 10% as much capital).
26
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Top–Down Bank Capital Regulation, 55 WASHBURN L.J.
327, 350 (2016) (noting that the BCBS “never demonstrated support for setting the original
risk based capital ratio at 8%” and stating that “[e]conomists Admati and Hellwig argue
for levels in the 20 to 30% range,” with others favoring 20% or more as well); cf.
GOODHART, supra note 24, at 178 (reporting that the G10 members of the BCBS
established the 8% standard after calculations of existing ratios indicated most countries
were at a 7–10% range).
27
RICHARD APOSTOLIK ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF BANKING RISK: AN OVERVIEW OF
BANKING, BANKING RISKS, AND RISK–BASED BANKING REGULATION 68–69 (2009).
28
See id. at 69.
23
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that Basel I’s floor made it profitable for banks to take more risk.29 Under
this framework, banks had to hold the same amount of capital for the
highest credit–quality companies as for lower credit–quality companies.30
Therefore, Basel I encouraged banks to make risker loans because they
could charge more for loans to the lowest credit–quality companies
without incurring a proportionately higher cost for capital.31
In response to the criticism that Basel I encouraged banks to take too
much risk and other concerns, the BCBS introduced Basel II in 2004.32
Basel II connected capital requirements to the actual risks inherent in
banks’ activities and assets, making capital standards more risk–sensitive.
Banks used the ability to calculate actual risks to justify capital levels
below the 8% floor of Basel I.33 Large and typically internationally–active
banks invested in sophisticated risk models to determine credit risk and
primary inputs to the capital calculation—the internal ratings–based
(“IRB”) approach.34 Under this approach, banks were able to use their
own history to determine borrowers’ probabilities of default (“PD”).35
Those using the advanced IRB approach were also able to rely on their
own inputs for maturity of the exposure, their own estimates for loss given
default (“LGD”), and their own estimates for exposure at default (“EAD”)
on an exposure–by–exposure basis.36
While the actual calculations of RWAs using PD, LGD, and EAD are
complex,37 the basic purpose of capital may be simply stated—to cover
unexpected losses.38 The BCBS stated that “an institution is expected to
suffer losses that exceed its level of . . . capital on average once in a

29

See id. at 68–71.
Id. at 70.
31
Id.
32
See id. at 71; see also DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 123 & n.60 (2008).
33
See Peihani, supra note 6 (unpublished dissertation at 123–24) (explaining from a
regulatory capture perspective that banks obtained concessions during the Basel II process
allowing them to reduce capital below the 8% floor).
34
See Basel Comm. on Bank Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, An Explanatory
Note on the Basel II IRB Risk Weight Functions, at 1 (July 2005) [hereinafter Basel II IRB],
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/irbriskweight.pdf; see also 3 Andrew Yeh, James Twaddle & Mike
Frith, Basel II: A New Capital Framework, 68 BULL. OF THE RES. BANK OF N.Z. 6 (Sept. 2005),
https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/-/media/ReserveBank/Files/Publications/Bulletins/2005/2005sep683yehtwaddlefrith.pdf.
35
See id. at 3–4; see also TARULLO, supra note 32 at 124, fig. 4.7.
36
Basel II IRB, supra note 34, at 1–4, 9–11; see also TARULLO, supra note 32, at 124
fig.4.7.
37
Vanessa Le Lesle & Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk–Weighted Assets 21 (Int’l
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 12/90, 2012), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/
WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Revisiting-Risk-Weighted-Assets-25807.
38
Basel II IRB, supra note 34, at 7.
30
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thousand years.”39 Accordingly, the BCBS advised banking supervisors
to analyze whether banks are incorporating considerations of unexpected
events in calculating their required level of capital.40 Further, the BCBS
explained that “[t]his analysis should cover a wide range of external
conditions and scenarios, and the sophistication of techniques and stress
tests used should be commensurate with the bank’s activities.”41
Still, Basel II only provided guidance regarding banks’ capital
adequacy; regulators required no standard method for calculating a loan
portfolio’s capital reserve.42 Also, the revised framework allowed national
supervisors discretion for implementation into national law of “dozens of
rules or standards,” which created further opportunity for variation in
practice.43 As Federal Reserve governor Daniel Tarullo asserted:
The revised [Basel II] framework was controversial even
before it was issued. Even as some large banks were
reassured by trial runs of the Basel II IRB formulas
showing that bank capital would decline, many academics
and policy commentators—and even a few legislators—
had concluded that the whole enterprise was significantly
deficient, if not wholly misguided. Some US regulators
had second thoughts as well, leading to a semi–public
interagency struggle over the degree to which US
implementing regulations would require more safeguards
against capital declines than are present in the revised
framework. The subprime crisis of 2007 reinforced the
case made by at least some of the skeptics and induced the
Basel Committee to propose significant modifications to
Basel II before it had even been fully implemented. These
post–2004 developments suggest the possibility that the
revised framework will be subject, if not to continuous
revision, then at least to continuous debate over whether
changes are needed.44
Thus, the BCBS began work on Basel III because some viewed Basel
II as having lowered the capital requirements under Basel I, and as being

39

Id. at 11.
International Convergence, supra note 20, at 210.
41
Id.
42
Jonathan B. Dressler & Loren W. Tauer, Estimating Expected and Unexpected Losses
for Agricultural Mortgage Portfolios, 98 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1470, 1471 (2016)
(referencing International Convergence, supra note 20, at 219).
43
TARULLO, supra note 32, at 123.
44
Id. at 10.
40
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inadequate in light of the financial crisis that began in 2007.45 In
December 2010, the BCBS issued Basel III rules with the following
objectives: 1) to improve the quality of banks’ capital, 2) to ensure the
amount of capital covered banks’ risk–taking activities, 3) to require banks
to build–up a capital cushion for use in periods of stress, and 4) to establish
global liquidity standards for banks.46 In particular, Basel III set forth a
leverage ratio requirement, which acted as a capital floor and limited
banks’ ability to lower their capital requirements through the use of
internal models. 47
Following the newer revisions of Basel III, however, the BCBS
observed undesirable practice–based variations in banks’ calculations of
RWAs, including differences in supervisory practices and differences
between banks in estimates of PD and LGD assigned to the same
borrowers.48 After its first study of the variability in RWAs in 2013, the
BCBS announced policy options it could use to address excessive
practice–based variations.49 Additionally, in its July 2013 report, the
BCBS specifically said:
Over the medium term, the Committee will examine the
potential to further harmonise national implementation
requirements and to put constraints on IRB parameter
estimates. This policy work would also benefit from
additional top–down analyses based on better data, such
as more granular information on the types of exposures

45

See id.
Press Release, Basel Comm. for Bank Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel III
Rules Text and Results of the Quantitative Impact Study Issued by the Basel Comm. (Dec.
16, 2010), http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm.
47
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Basel III: A Global
Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems, at 2 (rev. June
2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
48
See Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements,
Regulatory Consistency of Risk–Weighted Assets in the Banking Book – Report Issued by
the Basel Committee (July 5, 2013), http://www.bis.org/press/p130705.htm (“[T]here was
a high correlation in how banks rank a portfolio of individual borrowers. Differences exist,
however, in the levels of estimated risk, as expressed in probability of default (PD) and
loss–given–default (LGD), that banks assign. These differences drive the variation in risk
weights attributable to individual bank practices, and could result in the reported capital
ratios for some outlier banks varying by as much as 2 percentage points from a 10% risk–
based capital ratio benchmark (or 20% in relative terms) in either direction, although the
capital ratios for most banks fall within a narrower range.”).
49
Id.
46
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within bank portfolios and information on credit risk
mitigation.50
After the BCBS published four consultative documents from late 2015
to mid–2016, Secretary General William Coen reported in October 2016
that the committee had reviewed comments on its proposals and would be
issuing by year–end “a final package that reduces variability in risk–
weighted assets and helps restore credibility to banks’ risk–based capital
ratios.”51 Specific comments Secretary General Coen made about the
“package” included (1) noting that a move back toward a standardized
approach for calculating RWAs would negate the need for floors, (2)
suggesting that the BCBS could improve risk sensitivity within the
standardized approach, (3) providing notice of intent to curtail the use of
internal modeling approaches, and (4) warning that the BCBS is not
committing to no changes in capital requirements—by clarifying,
consistent with its position on no aggregate increase in capital, that capital
requirements should increase for riskier exposures and decrease for lower
risk exposures.52
Some in the banking industry objected to limitations on the use of
internal models, arguing that variations in RWA calculations are desirable
to reflect real differences in risk among jurisdictions and loan portfolios.53
Further, these proponents of maintaining the status quo point to regulatory
50

Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Regulatory
Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP): Analysis of Risk–Weighted Assets for Credit
Risk in the Banking Book, at 9 (2013) [hereinafter Regulatory Consistency],
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs256.pdf.
51
Coen, supra note 1; see also Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision,
Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Chairman of the Basel Committee Reaffirms Commitment
to Finalise Post–Crisis Basel III Reforms (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.bis.org/
press/p170302.htm (reporting that “finalization of Basel III will take longer than originally
expected”).
52
Coen, supra note 1; see also Briefing 2017, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining, for
example, that revisions in the risk–sensitivity of a standardized approach to replace IRB
modeling for mortgages would have the consequence of increasing capital requirements
“on [commercial and residential] mortgages with loan–to–value (LTV) ratios of more than
0.8 or when the repayment relies on cash flows generated by the property, while decreasing
requirements for those with low LTV ratio[s] (below 0.4)”).
53
Comment from the European Banking Fed’n to Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 4 (June 24, 2016) [hereinafter European Banking
Fed’n Comment], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/europeanbanking.pdf
(responding with (1) objection to “the use of parameter floors and the proposed restrictions
on the use of internal model for certain portfolios”; (2) argument that variability in RWAs
is desirable and reflective of differences in market and portfolio characteristics among
other factors; and (3) observation that most unwarranted variation is due to differences in
interpretation of the requirements of the IRB approach or due to choices allowed within
the approach).
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efforts, which will soon address any unjustified variation in RWAs, i.e.,
variations in defining default and, consequently, differences as to when
the maintenance of more capital in recognition of such a loan’s higher risk
is appropriate.54
Examining the regulatory analyses of variations in the RWA
calculations comparatively with banks’ explanations and justifications for
the variations illuminates issues as to (1) how much harmonization is
needed, (2) whether it is feasible to achieve accuracy in risk measurement,
and (3) whether concerns for oversight and comparability of banks’ RWA
calculations outweigh a presumably valid, but extremely complex, pursuit
of accurate risk measurement.

III. EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIABILITY IN CALCULATIONS
“[I]f the challenges that accompany[y] complex regulation are too
high, simpler rules may increase the efficacy of financial regulation.”55
Critics of model–based regulation assert that its complexity provides
competitive advantage to the largest banks because these banks use the
costly and sophisticated modeling techniques to lower their capital
requirements, providing them with capacity to increase their business
volume.56 Smaller banks without the resources to invest in sophisticated
models are relegated to the standardized and simpler approach for
calculating RWAs and capital requirements.57 Thus, the largest banks,
using the IRB approach, may gain a greater volume of business at the
expense of smaller banks unable to invest in modeling.58
Additionally, proponents of simplicity say that the complexity of the
IRB approach imposes unintended societal costs. These costs include the
cost of the people banks must employ to support complex models, and the
cost of more people within government to oversee banks’ use of complex

54

Id. at 4–5 (reporting that in 2015 the European Banking Authority (“EBA”) began
addressing the high level of variability among banks’ outcomes using the IRB approach
with a new framework to be implemented by 2020 at the latest).
55
Markus Behn, Rainer Haselmann & Vikrant Vig, The Limits of Model–Based
Regulation 1, 10, 13 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1928, 2016),
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1928.en.pdf?17ae15d416e9a8ff8b16bb
d3c746c471 (explaining their study is based upon the German credit register data of 1,603
German banks, 45 of which opted for IRB, and claiming to be the first paper to demonstrate
how banks used model–based regulation to economize their capital requirements).
56
Id. at 8–9.
57
Id.
58
See id.
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models.59 Some experts claim that increases in financial supervisors have
significantly out–paced the number of people working in the financial
industry.60 Others suggest that banks’ hiring of skilled talent to run the
complex models may be an inefficient allocation of society’s resources.61
Of even greater concern is that history demonstrates that the IRB
approach has produced meaningfully lower capital requirements than the
standardized approach, which some experts thought already too low.62
Critics argue that allowing banks to create their own inputs into elaborate
risk–weighted asset calculations results, unsurprisingly, in “gaming the
system” or a race to zero.63 Also, the variation presently occurring in
banks’ intricate RWA calculations aligns with the explanation that those
who employ the best talent will find the loopholes around compliance thus
making the models inequitable and their results incomparable.64
Accordingly, those opposed to the IRB approach contend that regulators
may be unable to detect the inappropriate exploitation of the models to
lower capital requirements.65
On the other hand, proponents of model–based regulation support
linking bank capital to bank asset risk by explaining that “risk–sensitivity”
in capital regulation allocates capital in an effective manner and facilitates
“sustainable and stable growth in the economy.”66 Supporters also note
that models for risk management provide banks with better knowledge
about risks, and de–linking them from capital calculations discourages
59

Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Address at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Financial Markets Conference, Constraining Discretion in Bank
Regulation 7 (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.bis.org/review/r130606e.pdf.
60
Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Remarks at the Int’l Fin.
Law Review Dinner, Turning the Red Tape Tide (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.
bis.org/review/r130411d.pdf.
61
See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 196 (2013).
62
Haldane, supra note 60; see also ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 61, at 178
(discussing historical support for much higher equity levels—at least 20 to 30 percent).
63
Haldane, supra note 60; see Behn, supra note 55, at 4.
64
Haldane, supra note 60; see Behn, supra note 55, at 4; see Lesle & Avramova, supra
note 37, at 27–28 (noting regulatory awareness that banks “cherry pick” methodologies in
modeling to optimize capital requirements).
65
Behn, supra note 55, at 5 n.2, 9 n.12 (citing one study that asserts once complex rules
are in place, the rules drive banks to accumulate assets which score favorably under the
models thus creating systemic risk such as that which occurred with residential loans and
their massive securitization during the recent crisis period).
66
EUR. ECON., THE USES (AND ABUSES) OF MODELLING ADJUSTMENTS, at 8–9 (2016),
http://www.europe-economics.com/publications/europe_economics_final_report_march_
2016.pdf; but see ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 61, at 108, 179, 219–22 (arguing that
substantially higher requirements for capital would be more efficient by reducing the cost
of equity, which should not be viewed as fixed but, rather, in relationship to risk; higher
capital requirements would also avoid the costs associated with financial instability).
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banks’ further investment in these tools.67 Modeling proponents also
argue that linking banks’ own risk assessment of borrowers to capital
allows banks to differentiate their pricing and prevents lower risk
borrowers from seeking better pricing in the unregulated “shadow–
banking” space.68
However, by linking bank capital with individual bank asset risk, the
current regulations validate the inherent complexity in assessing bank
capital in part because they are ever–evolving and require continuous re–
calibration.69 Even critics acknowledge that these complicated, risk–based
calculations need to be performed by the banks themselves, and regulators
must oversee each bank’s individualized calculations.70 In summary, a
model–based approach to RWA calculations may be doomed to
continually frustrate regulators’ capital adequacy oversight and investors’
capital adequacy assessments.71

A. The Regulatory View of Risk Sensitivity and Variation in RWAs
The BCBS declared in July 2013 that reducing the complexity of
RWA calculations was necessary because the non–uniform and complex
models confused stakeholders—such as banking supervisors and
investors—when they tried to assess banks’ capital adequacy.72
It
explained that, although linkage of regulatory models with bank risk
management techniques reduces the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage,
it drives excessive complexity in the capital framework as bank risk
management techniques increase in sophistication.73 In other words, the
need for simplicity to facilitate regulatory oversight outweighs the benefits
of linking capital requirements with banks’ individual risk management
practices.74 Supporting this position, the BCBS pointed out that there are
67

EUR. ECON., supra note 66, at 9–10.
See id.; but see ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 61, at 224–26 (arguing that it is
possible to regulate the shadow–banking sector).
69
Behn, supra note 55, at 4.
70
See id. at 33; see, e.g., FED. RES. SYS., CAPITAL PLANNING AT LARGE BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES: SUPERVISORY EXPECTATIONS AND RANGE OF CURRENT PRACTICE 1–2 (2013),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/bcreg20130819a1.pdf (explaining capital
assessment expectations for large, complex institutions generally and including the
requirement for firm specific assessments of risk).
71
See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlement, The Regulatory
Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability, at 1 (2013)
[hereinafter Regulatory Framework], http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs258.pdf (commenting
that pursuit of risk sensitivity has increased the complexity of RWA calculations to the
point where there may not be an appropriate balance between the goals of risk sensitivity,
simplicity, and comparability).
72
Id. at 12–13.
73
Id. at 9–10.
74
Id.
68
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possibly hundreds of models involved in determining consolidated capital
requirements using advanced mathematics for calculations, and regulators
are challenged to keep pace with banks’ risk management techniques.75
Contributing to complexity and comparability challenges, some banks
acquired exceptional treatment for RWA calculations even under the
standardized approach.76 Further, the BCBS noted that the Basel standards
allow significant national discretion beyond the typical supervisory
judgments that an internal model–based approach should entail,
exacerbating RWA variations and providing yet another challenge with
comparing banks’ RWAs.77
The BCBS’ July 2013 Discussion Paper, which announced the need
for simplicity in the capital framework,78 was published the same month
that it published its analysis of twenty–eight studies by twenty–one
organizations addressing the variability in banks’ calculations of RWAs.79
This analysis incorporated results from a hypothetical benchmarking
exercise the BCBS conducted where banks provided their actual risk
parameters for various sovereign, financial, and corporate borrowers.80
While the benchmarking study concluded there was a high level of
consistency in banks’ assessment of relative riskiness of obligors, it
determined that there were undesirable differences in banks’ PD and LGD
estimates used to calculate levels of risk.81 Noting the low–default nature
of the sovereign and bank asset classes in particular, the BCBS said a lack
of appropriate data may be a factor causing the estimate differences and
RWA variability between banks.82
Overall, the BCBS analysis found that around 75% of RWA variations
were attributable to the corporate and retail asset classes.83 It concluded
that while most of the RWA variation in the corporate and retail portfolios
related to actual differences in risk versus modeling practices, the RWA
variations remained excessive.84

75

Id.
Id. (explaining that these exceptions often exhibited differentiated jurisdictional
attributes).
77
Regulatory Framework, supra note 71, at 1, 18 (explaining that national discretion
“should improve comparability and the evenness of the playing field, as the treatment of
dissimilar risks is not forced into a ‘one size fits all’ template”; but, in practice, this can
also impair the comparability of RWAs).
78
Id. at 1–2.
79
Regulatory Consistency, supra note 50, at 13 & n.23.
80
Id. at 26.
81
Id. at 6.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 18.
84
See id. at 26, 46.
76
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Noting that internal models, even when linked to individual risk
management practices, should have similar conceptual foundations and
data sources, the BCBS was critical of materially significant practiced–
based modeling variations needing resolution.85 Summarizing on–site
discussions with banks, the BCBS commented that bank data and
modeling choices were significant drivers of RWA variation.86
Specifically, the BCBS identified “themes” involving a general lack of
data for low default portfolios covered by the hypothetical exercise,
variations in the quality of reference data used in bank estimates, and short
timeframes associated with data reference sets indicating that these data
sets might not be capturing downturn scenarios to be sufficiently
conservative estimates of risk.87
The BCBS commented that it would pursue various short–term and
medium–term policy initiatives to reduce the practice–based variations.88
These initiatives included: (1) enhancing bank disclosure requirements to
improve transparency and better inform stakeholders about underlying risk
differentiators, (2) providing more guidance to banks, e.g., relative to the
use of external data for low–default portfolios, (3) harmonizing national
requirements to eliminate unwarranted differences between jurisdictions,
and (4) constraining IRB parameter estimates, including creating floors.89
The BCBS published a second report on RWA variation in April 2016
focused on retail and small and medium–sized enterprise (SME) loan
portfolios, and the variability in estimates of exposure at the time of default
(EAD) across the entire banking book.90 The qualified findings were
based on two BCBS data collections conducted in September and October
of 2014.91 The study determined that average PD estimates for all banks
and portfolios aligned closely with actual default experience, and it
reported that banks experienced fewer defaults than estimated for the

85

See Regulatory Consistency, supra note 50, at 46 (commenting that the introduction
of judgment resulted in greater variation); see also Regulatory Framework, supra note 71,
at 18 (observing that regulatory and risk management models should have “similar
conceptual foundations and data sources”).
86
Regulatory Consistency, supra note 50, at 8 & n.19.
87
Id. at 46.
88
Id. at 9.
89
Id. at 9–10.
90
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlement, Regulatory
Consistency Assessment Programme (RCAP) Analysis of Risk–Weighted Assets for Credit
Risk in the Banking Book, at 2 (2016) [hereinafter Regulatory Consistency 2016],
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d363.pdf?_sm_au_=iVVk10t8St57pnZT.
91
Id. (“Data on Retail/SME exposures were received from 35 major internationally
active banks across 13 jurisdictions. Data on EAD were received from 37 banks across 17
jurisdictions. Information was also gathered during meetings with representatives from a
subgroup of banks that submitted data and via a survey of supervisors.”).
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sample period.92 However, for the same period, the study did not find
similar alignment between average LGD estimates and actual loss rates.93
It also said the results were mixed relative to average EAD estimates and
loss outcomes.94 Again, the BCBS concluded there were material
practice–based variations, relative to PD, LGD, and EAD, which would
benefit from potential policy initiatives.95
Highlighting the extreme complexity of RWA calculations,96 the
BCBS listed several policy initiatives, targeting technical aspects of the
calculations, to harmonize banks’ modeling with best–practice risk
measurement standards.97 For example, the BCBS suggested it could
develop a “[b]etter definition around what is meant by ‘long–run average’
with respect to PD estimation and acceptable methodologies and data with
which to calibrate to these long–run averages.”98 It also said that RWA
outcome consistency could benefit from more guidance on rating systems
that banks should use in PD estimates, e.g. the use of systems oriented to
point–in–time (“PIT”) or through the cycle (“TTC”) estimates.99
Additionally, the BCBS determined that better informing banks about
what is considered a “downturn” and providing guidance as to what to do
when reference data sets do not include stress period observations could
improve banks’ calculations.100 Further, it identified opportunity to
harmonize differences in banks’ treatments of recovery estimates for loans
in the process of collection within the LGD estimation process, which
could reduce unwarranted variation.101 The BCBS also determined that
practice–based RWA variability could benefit from harmonizing discount
rates banks apply to recovery cash flows.102 Relative to estimation of
EADs, the BCBS stated that clarifying data censoring techniques—
92

Id. at 2–3 (expressing criticism that few banks provided data going back more than
five years).
93
Id. at 3.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 2–3, 21–23 (noting severe data limitations in the study and highlighting
discussions with bank participants as informing the more significant sources of practice–
based RWA variation in these portfolios).
96
Lesle & Avramova, supra note 37, at 21.
97
Regulatory Consistency 2016, supra note 90, at 22–23.
98
Id.
99
Id.; see also Jesus Alan Elizondo Flores, et al., Financial Stability Institute 2010
Award Winning Paper, Regulatory Use of System–Wide Estimations of PD, LGD and EAD,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS: FINANCIAL STABILITY INSTITUTE 5 (Sept. 2010),
http://www.bis.org/fsi/awp2010.pdf (commenting that “system–wide PIT estimations of
PD consistently underestimate and overestimate the observed default rates . . . in
respectively lower and higher risk segments of the economic cycle”).
100
Regulatory Consistency 2016, supra note 90, at 22.
101
Id. at 22–23.
102
Id. at 22.
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removing data at the extremes or applying floors and caps to data—would
reduce practice–based calculation differences.103
Focusing on overall reliability, the BCBS suggested it could provide
more guidance about model validation techniques, such as directing that
models be recalibrated if they produce “large and persistent gaps between
actual defaults, actual loss experience, and IRB estimates.”104 In the
absence of the BCBS being able to assess the adequacy of banks’
calculations because of shortcomings in the data it received, it suggested
that model validation could assist in confirming the appropriateness of
model calculations when supervisory oversight affirms their
effectiveness.105 Model validation should prompt banks to recalibrate
when necessary even if their modeling practices fail to identify the need.
In March 2016, because of its continued findings of excessive
variation in RWA calculations, the BCBS proposed changes to reduce
complexity and improve comparability by imposing various floors and
limiting the range of practices relative to model input parameters for loan
portfolios where IRB would remain an option.106 As discussed supra in
part I, responses to the consultative document, predominately from
European banks, were critical.107

103

Id.
Id. at 22–23.
105
See id. at 22–23, 36–39 (“Harmonisation in the area of model validation could
ultimately lead to reductions in practice–based RWA variation.”).
106
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Consultative
Document: Reducing Variation in Credit Risk–Weighted Assets—Constraints on the Use
of Internal Model Approaches, at 1, 7 (2016) [hereinafter Reducing Variation],
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d362.pdf (“One of the lessons from the financial crisis is that
not all credit risk exposures are capable of being modelled sufficiently reliably or
consistently for use in determining regulatory capital requirements.”).
107
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Comments received on the “Reducing
variation in credit risk–weighted assets – constraints on the use of internal model
approaches – consultative document”, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS [hereinafter
Comments on Reducing Variation], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/
d362/overview.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (listing comments from 73 individual
responders—one comment is duplicative—following the BCBS’ release of the consultative
document on March 24, 2016, inviting comments by June 24, 2016); see e.g., Position
Paper of European Association of Public Banks, at 1 (June 24, 2016), http://www.
bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/eaopb.pdf (“reject[ing] the suggested removal of IRBA
for certain portfolios as this would lead to a dramatic reduction in risk sensitivity of
regulatory capital requirements and could cause faulty signalling in banks as well as a
destabilisation of the financial system”).
104
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B. The Banking Industry View of Risk Sensitivity and Variation in
RWAs
European banks are at a disadvantage relative to the changes the
BCBS has proposed for RWA calculations because EU banks engage more
than U.S. banks in direct lending with less opportunity to provide services
requiring less capital, such as U.S. banks enjoy.108 Because the BCBS’
proposed changes in the RWA calculations affect direct lending, and banks
believe they increase capital requirements for direct lending, the changes
disproportionately affect EU banks.109 Nearly all banks responding to the
BCBS’ March 2016 proposal, however, objected strongly to the BCBS’s
proposed move toward standardization of RWA calculations and to the
limitations it proposed on the use of internal models for calculating
RWAs.110 Industry representatives also responded to the BCBS
consultative document,111 raising concerns about the proposed changes’
adverse impact on availability of credit at reasonable costs to industry.112

108

Briefing 2017, supra note 1, at 10–11 (commenting that “in the United States large
corporates rely less on bank credit [because of other market alternatives] and residential
mortgages exposures are offloaded to federal agencies”).
109
Id. at 10–11 (explaining that EU banks hold more exposures on their books than U.S.
banks where alternatives exist such as selling loans to government agencies).
110
See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., European
Banking Federation Comment, supra note 53, at 4 (stating “we disagree on the use of
parameter floors and the proposed restrictions on the use of internal model for certain
portfolios,” arguing that variability in RWAs is desirable and reflective of differences in
market and portfolio characteristics among other factors and noting that regulatory and
industry sources have established that most unwarranted variation is due to differences in
interpretation of the requirements of the IRB approach or due to choices allowed within
the approach).
111
See, e.g., Comment from the GdW Bundesverband deutscher Wohnungs–und
Immobilienunternehmen e.V. to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, at 1 (June 2016) [hereinafter GdW Comment], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/
comments/d362/gbdwui.pdf (representing the German real estate industry).
112
See generally id. (disagreeing with proposed restrictions on the IRB approach, and
commenting that the BCBS’ proposed changes will lead to a deterioration in financing
terms for loans secured by real estate); see also Letter from Aviation Working Group to
Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 3 (June 21, 2016),
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/aviationworking.pdf (citing harm to . . . the
air transport sector, on account of specialised lending becoming economically less
attractive”).
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While some responses were very brief in summarizing objections,113
others referenced empirical evidence,114 and some provided detailed
explanations for their positions—including one that attached a full–blown
consulting study supporting the accuracy and credibility of bank
calculations under the existing model–based approach for specialized
lending.115 The leasing company submitting the consulting study argued
that specialized lending such as leasing should not be subjected to the
BCBS’s proposed floors for calculating RWAs because their study
affirmed the asset class’s lower risk, and the proposed changes would
unjustifiably increase capital levels for this asset class.116
In fact, similar to the leasing company’s expressed concern, many of
the comment letters equated the BCBS’s proposal with significant
increases in bank capital requirements resulting from an undesirable loss
of risk–sensitivity.117 Consequently, banks argued that the proposed
changes would adversely affect the cost and availability of credit and
hinder economic growth.118 In addition, some bank commenters argued
113

See, e.g., Letter from the Czech Banking Association to Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 1–2 (June 24, 2016) (providing a two–page
response suggesting that output floors be applied at the institution level rather than at more
granular levels and requesting clarification on certain aspects of the proposal),
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/czechbankingass.pdf; see also Letter from
Wirawat Panthawangkun, Chairman, Basel Club, to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision,
Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 1–2 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/comments/d362/baselclubthaila.pdf (providing a two–page response asserting the
importance of maintaining risk sensitivity).
114
See Letter from Lars Rohde, Bd. of Governors, Danmarks Nationalbank, to Basel
Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 1–4 (June 24, 2016),
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/danmarksnationa.pdf (providing empirical
data for Danish banks’ low risk and losses relative to retail mortgages, and asserting that
Danish banks’ LGDs are low relative to other countries because of structural factors
allowing for easy and fast foreclosure rather than longer foreclosure processes that produce
higher losses).
115
Letter from Leon Dhaene, Dir. Gen., Leaseurope, to Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 1–4 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/comments/d362/leaseurope.pdf (commenting that their experience is that credit risk
models have been reliable, citing the supervisory authorities’ years of investment in
controlling and validating the models and referencing the Deloitte research they attached
demonstrating that leasing LGDs are significantly lower than the proposed floors).
116
Id.
117
See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from
Hans Lindberg & Maria Nilsson, Swedish Bankers’ Ass’n, to Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 2–3 (June 23, 2016), https://www.bis.org/
bcbs/publ/comments/d362/swedishbankersa.pdf (noting that large corporates “are
generally regarded as lower risk than portfolios with high default frequencies,” and
asserting these loans should not be subjected to a less risk–sensitive treatment that is likely
to result in much higher capital requirements).
118
See, e.g., Letter from Simon Hills, British Bankers Ass’n, to Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 3 (June, 2016) [hereinafter British Bankers
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that the proposed changes’ imposition of higher capital requirements
would increase overall systemic risk by driving low risk borrowers to seek
better pricing in the unregulated shadow–banking sector.119
Banks also complained in their responses that the proposal’s move
toward a less risk–sensitive framework disjoins banks’ risk management
processes from regulatory capital requirements.120 In addition to the
significant existing investment in systems, some banks argued that
disconnecting internal risk management from the regulatory capital
framework discourages further investment in risk management techniques
and will lower the quality of risk management practices.121 Hoping to
mitigate this outcome, a few banks proposed alternatives, which would
preserve use of existing risk management systems tied to capital
requirements and protect the significant investments at the same time.122
Letter], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/britishbankersa.pdf (stating that
many of its members consider that the new requirements are “likely to result in increased
capital requirements” and noting the possible adverse consequences of such to economic
growth); see also Letter from David Wagner, Exec. Managing Dir., The Clearing House
Ass’n L.L.C., to the Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at
10–11 (June 24, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from The Clearing House],
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/theclearinghous.pdf (citing authority for
the proposition that “imposing overly high capital requirements on banks harms the global
economy by limiting access to financing and liquidity”).
119
See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; British Bankers
Ass’n Letter, supra note 118, at 3 (commenting that “these proposals may drive some
businesses to other areas of financial services, such as insurance and ‘shadow banking,’
some of which may be outside the current scope of prudential supervision and oversight”).
120
See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from
Mark E. White, Senior Vice President & Head Enterprise Risk, Bank of Montreal, to
William Coen, Secretary, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, at 2 (June 26, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from Bank of Montreal],
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/bmofinancialgro.pdf (stating that “[e]ven
where this will not increase capital, . . . the industry generally prefers model restrictions
that do not interfere with risk management practices – e.g. if LGDs for an asset class are
considered too variable and some banks appear to have unreasonably low LGDs, rather
than flooring LGDs, the better intervention is to require a minimum RWA as it will better
support the continuation of existing risk management and parameter discovery practices”).
121
See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from
Japanese Bankers Ass’n to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, at 5 (June 26, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/
japanesebankers.pdf (stating that the BCBS proposal will “disincentivise banks from
enhancing their risk management practices and could lead ultimately to deterioration in the
level of risk management at banks” and further commenting that “the BCBS appears to
excessively focus on comparability and simplicity and does not sufficiently consider risk
sensitivity”).
122
See Letter from Hedwige Nuyens, Managing Director, & Debbie Crossman, Chair of
the Prudential Supervision Working Grp., Int’l Banking Fed’n, to the Basel Comm. on
Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 3 (June 26, 2016), https://www.
bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/ibfed.pdf (“More guidance on definitions such as
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Additionally, commenters frequently argued that the loss of risk–
sensitivity could cause banks to take more risk to increase expected
returns.123 Some observed that this change could result in herd effects
leading to greater systemic risks.124
While the controversy surrounding the benefits of model–based
regulation’s risk sensitivity versus the downside of complexity are not
new, commenters seemed genuinely surprised by the BCBS’s proposal to
restrict the use of internal models and by the magnitude of the proposed
changes.125 Due to their surprise, some commenters included strong

recognition of default, length of LGD recovery periods, LGD discount rates, and required
conservatism for sources of uncertainty in combination with well–informed floors would
reduce RWA variability, thereby supporting the retention of the A–IRB approach for most
risk classes . . . permitting banks to continue leveraging their A–IRB infrastructure where
important investments have been made including those related to risk management
capabilities.”); see also Letter from Bank of Montreal, supra note 121, at 2 (“better
intervention is to require a minimum RWA as it will better support the continuation of
existing risk management and parameter discovery practices”).
123
See, e.g., Letter from Italian Banking Ass’n to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision,
Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 4–5 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/
comments/d362/italianbankinga.pdf (noting increased standardization at the expense of
risk sensitivity causes banks to prefer to finance risker and more profitable counterparties
given a flat cost of capital and “encourage[s] so–called herd behavior amongst banks . . .
to invest in the same types of assets characterized by relatively low capital absorption,
therefore potentially amplifying systemic risk in the event of crisis”).
124
Id.; Joint Letter from David Strongin, Exec. Dir., Glob. Fin. Mkt. Ass’n, et al., to
Stefan Ingves, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, at 7 (June 21, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/giij.pdf
(“The less risk sensitive the framework is, the more opportunities for regulatory arbitrage
are created, incentivising firms to seek higher risk assets as a means of boosting returns . . .
[causing] herd effects, leading to less diversity in banks’ portfolios . . . [with] a
corresponding increase in risk in the financial system as a whole.”).
125
Letter from Roselyne Renel, Glob. Head, Standard Chartered, to Secretariat, Basel
Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 3 (June 20, 2016),
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/standardcharter.pdf
(“The
proposals
represent the most fundamental set of changes to the calculation of risk–weighted assets
since Basel II, therefore should be subject to the same level of consultation and analysis;
by way of comparison Basel II took 7 years and involved many consultations and 5
quantitative impact studies.”); Letter from The Clearing House, supra note 118, at 5 (“[I]n
advance of finalizing and evaluating the cumulative impact of [the many] revisions to the
Basel III capital framework, the Basel Committee is now attempting to layer the proposed
Standardized Approach–based constraints onto the calculation of risk–weighted assets
under the A–IRB Approach as set forth in the Consultation . . . [without providing] banking
organizations, market participants or other interested parties with any meaningful
opportunity to holistically review and comment on the entirety of the Basel Committee’s
revisions in the same manner afforded during the Basel II and Basel III processes . . . [and]
without the benefit of considering the potential cumulative effects of the various proposals
in the aggregate.”).
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language in their responses.126 For example, the French Banking
Federation said, “[w]e warn that the Committee should not hastily validate
a change of this magnitude without proper time for consensus building,
iterations between jurisdictions and with the industry, and proper impact
studies.”127
Arguing for retaining the existing model–based approaches, several
commenters argued that the BCBS should pursue better supervision of
models and allow time for harmonization of IRB estimation practices to
achieve a reduction in RWA variability.128 Some banks specifically
identified the current efforts of the European Banking Authority to
harmonize calculations and reduce unwarranted variability.129
A couple of commenters requested that the BCBS recognize, when
addressing RWA variability, that there are different business models and
supervisory
environments
with
legitimately
different
risk
characteristics.130 Thus, they argue that it is desirable to retain RWA
variability because it reflects actual differences in the riskiness of bank
assets stemming from variations in operating environments.131

126

See e.g., Letter from Doris Ma, Sec’y, The Hong Kong Association of Banks to Basel
Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l Settlements, at 4 (June 24, 2016),
[hereinafter Letter from The Hong Kong Ass’n of Banks], http://www.bis.org/bcbs/
publ/comments/d362/hkaob.pdf (“[I]n terms of the timeline, we understand the Basel
Committee’s ambition to finalise requirements by the end of 2016; but would caution that
the suite of regulatory change underway . . . is far–reaching in nature and represent a
fundamental change to the entire regulatory capital framework.”).
127
Comment from French Banking Fed’n to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank
for Int’l Settlements, at 1, 5–6 (June 24, 2016) [hereinafter Letter from French Banking
Fed’n], https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/frenchbankingfe.pdf.
128
See Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from The
Hong Kong Ass’n of Banks, supra note 126, at 2–3 (“[T]he objective of reducing
variability of risk weights should be fundamentally addressed via harmonising key
modelling input definitions such as default, down–turn, data sufficiency criteria, etc.[,] . . .
and providing more specific guidance and clarifications issued by supervisors instead of
introducing output floors.”).
129
See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from
French Banking Fed’n, supra note 127, at 3 (“[T]remendous efforts have been made and
are underway by the European Banking Authority (EBA) through its benchmarking
exercises and multiple consultations . . . leading models and parameters calculations to
converge, hence to more comparability and less undue variability.”).
130
See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from
Canadian Bankers Ass’n, supra note 5, at 2–3 (“[T]here are several fundamental reasons
for variation in RWA – differences in modelling choices and data inputs, supervisory
guidance across jurisdictions, and differences in business strategy, systemic risk, products,
transaction/customer risk and risk management practices.” “[S]ome divergence in practices
in measuring RWA should be reasonably expected as homogeneous risk weights result in
even greater and undesirable systemic risk.”).
131
Letter from Canadian Bankers Ass’n, supra note 5, at 2–3.
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There were also technical observations in the comment letters
expressing concern about categories of loans that would unjustifiably
receive less favorable treatment under the proposed changes, which could
be useful for the BCBS to consider in finalizing standards.132 For example,
American Express, while expressing full support for the BCBS proposal,
requested a broader definition for “transactors”—those considered lower
risk because they essentially pay their debt off monthly—in order to
preclude an overly conservative RWA calculation resulting in higher
capital requirements.133
The table below summarizes commenters’ main observations and
criticisms:
Number of
Percentage of
Comment
Commenters Commenters
1) Criticism that becoming less risk
sensitive by mandating floors for
losses rather than using actual loss
history has one or more of the
following adverse consequences: a)
creates opportunity for regulatory
arbitrage whereby banks take more
risk to increase expected returns, b)
increases costs for relatively lower
risk borrowers by driving them to
the unregulated shadow–banking
market, which increases systemic
risk, and/or c) disjoins banks’ risk
management processes from
regulatory capital requirements
creating inefficiencies and
disincentives to invest further in
advanced risk management
techniques.
61
84%

132

See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see e.g., Letter from
The Hong Kong Ass’n of Banks, supra note 126, at 3 (“For instance, the provision of trade
finance, which is especially important to SMEs and in emerging markets, will suffer from
the introduction of Exposure at Default (EAD) floors and limitations on the determination
of the Maturity (M) parameter, as well as the reversal of Bank exposures to the
Standardised Approach as some of the common trade finance products such as letters of
credit are treated as exposures to banks / FIs.”).
133
Letter from Jeffrey Campbell, Exec. Vice President & Chief Fin. Officer, American
Express Co., to Secretariat, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, at 4–5 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/
americanexpress.pdf.
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2) Assertion that change is
unnecessary because shortcomings
in existing modeling techniques may
be addressed by the BCBS through
a) harmonizing supervisory and
modelling practices, including the
provision of more parameter
definitions to ensure modeling
consistency, and/or b) taking account
of benchmarking and stress testing
exercises, which produce valuable
data for capital adequacy
assessment.
3) Concern expressed as to treatment
of large corporates including a)
treating subsidiaries equivalent to its
parent, b) providing thresholds for
differentiating treatment of
corporates based on their size
without justification for the
threshold, and c) eliminating the use
of internal rankings for non–public
obligors does not recognize
operating differences between
jurisdictions, and an alternative
solution whereby data is pooled
among creditors would be
preferable.
4) Criticism that considerably more
lead time is necessary for
implementation of changes*.
5) Observation that model changes
need to be coordinated with
accounting standards to reduce
reporting complexity and dual
bookkeeping.
6) Generally, expressed support for
the BCBS proposal.

119

43

59%

37

51%

22

30%

15

21%

5

7%

*Many more may be inferred to hold this belief.134
134

See Appendix for bank comment listing; see generally Comments on Reducing
Variation, supra note 107.
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In contrast to the banks’ emphasis on risk sensitivity, Finance Watch,
an independent non–profit public interest association, submitted a
comment letter arguing for the BCBS to continue to move toward greater
standardization and simplicity stating:
At present, banks enjoy a significant degree of freedom in
the design of regulatory risk models, which allows them
to arbitrage capital weights to reduce capital and expand
leverage. Therefore, we welcome also the BCBS’s aim to
review the structure of the regulatory framework
including considerations of the costs and benefits of
basing regulatory capital on banks’ internal models and
alternative approaches to determining regulatory capital.
Bearing in mind the shortcomings of internal models,
arising mostly from model uncertainty, complexity and
regulatory arbitrage, Finance Watch is convinced that the
regulatory framework should not rely on them as a
major . . . indicator of capital.135

IV. ALTERNATIVES FOR RWA CALCULATIONS
“It may be that the ultimate aim of a framework that is both simple
and risk sensitive is unachievable.”136
The BCBS noted its intention in July 2013 to retain risk–sensitivity
while simplifying the capital framework by constraining the use of internal
models.137 Despite this long–standing declaration, there are responses to
135

Letter from Fin. Watch to Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, at 2 (June 24, 2016), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/comments/d362/
financewatch.pdf.
136
David Strachan, Bank Capital Regulation | Where Next for the Good Ship Basel?,
Deloitte Fin. Servs.’: UK Blog (Nov. 30, 2015), http://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/financial
services/2015/11/bank-capital-regulation-where-next-for-the-good-ship-basel.html
(arguing for regulators to pull back from pushing the proposed model changes on banks at
a time when political branches are focused on the economy, and to “persist with the current
standardised approach to credit risk”); Kevin Clarke & Roozbeh Alavi, First Take: Five
Key Points from Basel’s Proposed Restrictions on Internal Models for Credit Risk, PwC
(Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory-services/
publications/assets/basel-models-credit-risk-march-2016.pdf (stating that banks should
improve their standardized approach to calculating regulatory capital noting that “[t]he
Basel proposal does not completely prohibit the use of IRB approaches, but nevertheless
foreshadows the eventual phase–out of internal models for regulatory capital
calculations”).
137
See Regulatory Framework, supra note 71, at 18 (“While the introduction of capital
floors may blunt the incentive to develop internal models, banks will still need to develop
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the March 2016 consultative document,138 which demonstrate that banks
around the world were not prepared for the changes the BCBS proposed.139
Banks and regulators frame the issue as one of risk–sensitivity versus
complexity, and alternatives seem limited to whether or not regulations
will allow internal estimates to drive the risk weights that determine capital
requirements. Given that choice, the regulatory arguments regarding the
benefits of simplicity seem to outweigh the banks’ arguments for risk–
sensitivity, which are heavily connected to opposition to higher capital
requirements. The evidence from various regulatory and expert studies
suggests, inter alia, that model complexity—in its pursuit of risk
measurement accuracy—imposes excessive costs on society, creates
undue challenges to regulatory oversight, and prevents transparency with
respect to the investing public seeking to understand relative differences
in risk among the banks.
However, some experts argue that the issue of risk–based modeling
needs to be viewed from a broader perspective—that of financial stability.
They favor much higher standardized capital levels,140 which might
actually ensure that banks only exceed their “capital on average once in a
thousand years.”141 As one example, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis proposes raising the largest banks’ common equity capital
levels to a 23.5 percent ratio arguing that the benefits outweigh the costs.142
Eliminating a risk–based framework in favor of a simple and large
capital level requirement would nullify RWA calculations and resolve the
variability issues and debate.143 However, it is unlikely that regulators will
models for their own risk management and pricing purposes: regulation should not be the
sole justification for the development of models by banks.”).
138
See generally Reducing Variation, supra note 106.
139
See generally Comments on Reducing Variation, supra note 107; see, e.g., Letter from
French Banking Fed’n, supra note 127, at 1 (“We are doubtful that such a major change be
warranted, nor that it could realistically be decided in the short timeframe left for the
finalization of the proposed framework due for end 2016.”).
140
See, e.g., Schooner, supra note 26, at 342–44, 350.
141
See Basel II IRB, supra note 34, at 7.
142
FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 9TH DIST., THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO
BIG TO FAIL, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 (2016), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/
~/media/files/publications/studies/endingtbtf/the-minneapolis-plan/the-minneapolis-planto-end-too-big-to-fail-2016.pdf?la=en (commenting that requiring “[the largest] banks to
issue common equity equal to 23.5 percent of risk–weighted assets, with a corresponding
leverage ratio of 15 percent . . . maximizes the net benefits to society from higher capital
levels . . . [by] substantially [reducing] the chance of public bailouts relative to current
regulations from 67 percent to 39 percent . . . at a relatively low cost of gross domestic
product (GDP).”).
143
Letter from The Clearing House, supra note 118, at 11 (asserting that “standardized
measures require standardized categories, [and] they inevitably involve the collapse of
assets with widely varying risk profiles into a single category assigned a single risk
measure”).
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move to such a simple, high level of capital mandate in the near term, even
if it is the best public policy and could be implemented over a significant
period of time to avoid any possibility of disruptive economic effects. It
is unlikely for several reasons. First, the BCBS provided assurances about
not raising aggregate capital levels.144 Second, U.S. politics has shifted
toward banks’ perspectives on regulation as evidenced by the Chairman of
the House Financial Services Committee proposing to undo provisions of
the Dodd–Frank Act.145 Third, the EU Commission recently commented
that action is needed to reduce undue regulatory burden as it pertains to
financing the economy.146
Perhaps an alternative to the IRB approach, in the shorter term, is to
further improve granularity under the existing standardized approach for
calculating RWAs.147 While leaving for another day the very important
issue of adequate minimum levels of bank capital, this approach would
retain some risk–sensitivity in the capital framework while simplifying
calculations.148 Some banks suggest that internal risk models could inform
decisions regarding an asset’s assignment to a risk category within the
standardized approach.149 The benefit of preserving use of the internal
144

See generally Reducing Variation, supra note 106.
Caroline Bradley, An Unsafe Financial System, JOTWELL (Dec. 6, 2016) (reviewing
Anat R. Admati, It Takes a Village to Maintain a Dangerous Financial System, in Just
Financial Markets? Finance in a Just Society (Lisa Herzog ed., forthcoming 2017)),
http://corp.jotwell.com/an-unsafe-financial-system
(“These
developments
imply
something of a slide back to pre–crisis thinking.”); accord Geoffrey Smith, Read the Full
Cease and Desist Letter a Senior Congressman Just Sent to Janet Yellen, Fortune Finance,
Feb. 3, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/02/03/read-the-full-cease-and-desist-letter-a-seniorcongressman-just-sent-to-janet-yellen/ (attaching a letter from a vice–chairman on the
House Financial Services Committee to Janet Yellen stating that “[i]t is incumbent upon
all regulators to support the U.S. economy, and scrutinize international agreements that are
killing American jobs”).
146
Bradley, supra note 145; see also Huw Jones, Regulators to delay meeting in bid to
reach bank capital deal, THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2017, 6:53 AM), http://www.
nydailynews.com/newswires/news/business/regulators-delay-meeting-bid-reach-bankcapital-deal-article-1.3377932 (indicating that European banks’ opposition is having an
impact because “[b]anking regulators will postpone their next meeting in another bid to
agree on global capital rules, taking more time to try to overcome objections from European
banks to minimum capital levels”); but see Mohamed A. El–Erian, There’s Still Too Much
Risk in the Financial System, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Aug. 10, 2017 1:00 AM EDT),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-10/there-s-still-too-much-risk-in-thefinancial-system (warning against complacency).
147
Letter from Canadian Bankers Ass’n, supra note 5, at 4 (“In the event . . . the
Committee proceeds with its proposal to require the standardized approach . . . we
recommend more granularity in the risk weight buckets than is proposed in the Revised
Standardised approach . . . [and] [r]isk weights could also be mapped to the Bank’s internal
ratings.”).
148
Id.
149
E.g., id.
145
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models for this purpose is that it maintains incentive to continue enhancing
these models, including the quality of the data that serves as input to them.
And, banks may have a point about the benefits of continued investments
in analytics.150 A February 2016 IFC Working Paper suggested that
central banks should engage in defining a framework for the potential use
of big data to inform policy decisions, and an important source of data for
central banks would be from individual banks.151

V. CONCLUSION
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”152
While the minimum level of capital required to ensure financial
stability is desperately in need of greater attention, politics do not presently
favor increasing bank capital. With nearly a decade having passed,
memory of the last financial crisis appears to be fading. Further, financial
stability, the ultimate purpose for capital, is not well served by arguments
that debate whether models can accurately predict the current capital
requirements at a six, seven, eight, nine, or even ten percent level of risk–
weighted assets. The levels of capital being discussed appear much too
low on their face to provide an adequate cushion when confronted with
periods of economic stress. However, one of the failings of the current
system is that internal models had not proved their veracity prior to use.
Also, in coming to the decision to simplify, the BCBS noted several times
that the data banks used in modeling did not incorporate data for periods
of significant downturn.
Perhaps a more objective approach for reconciling modeling, RWA
calculations, and capital risk management is for the BCBS to undertake an
overall study of capital adequacy that would achieve the objective of
150

Retail Banks and Big Data: Big Data as the Key to Better Risk Management, THE
ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT 4–5 (2014), http://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/
default/files/RetailBanksandBigData%20%281%29.pdf (noting that bankers surveyed
believe credit risk is an area of great potential for big data and its tools to impact
improvement in risk management).
151
Per Nymand–Andersen, Big Data: The Hunt for Timely Insights and Decision
Certainty 6, 15 (IFC, Working Papers No. 14, 2016), http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/
ifcwork14.pdf (“As the mandates of many central banks have been extended to cover, in
particular, financial stability and banking supervision in addition to monetary policy, . . .
the scope for using ‘big data’ as a source of relevant information [may have] increased . . .
to [help] detect trends and turning points within the economy, thereby providing
supplementary and more timely information compared to the “traditional” toolkit of central
banks.”).
152
LEWIS CAROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 53 (150th Anniversary ed.,
Princeton University Press 2015) (1897).
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minimizing tail risk—the risk of inadequate capital during a crisis—to no
more than once every thousand years. A more risk–sensitive standardized
approach for calculating RWAs could align with such a benchmark study
to achieve the financial stability objective. As suggested by some of the
bank comment letters, banks could use their models for calculating where
assets would fall within the standardized approach, calculate their RWAs
based upon more finely gradated risk categories, and thus determine their
capital requirements while maintaining a link to their risk management
processes. Such an approach would also provide simplicity for easing
oversight and comparability concerns of regulators and investors.
Additionally, considering the continued evolution of technology and
advanced analytics using big data, there appears to be merit in maintaining
a role for banks’ internal models. As noted, banks and banking supervisors
have significant investment in credit risk modeling techniques, which are
also linked to banks’ risk management practices. These investments
include validation of the models’ outputs as well as validation of the data
inputs. While perhaps in need of further enhancement to fully incorporate
tail risk, refined models, and the data input to them, could provide useful
information to central banks for managing risk beyond the institutional
level.
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APPENDIX
#
1
2
3
4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21

Entity Name
ABN–AMRO
American Express
Asian Bankers
Association
Association
Francaise des
Sociétés Financiéres
Australian Bankers’
Association
Austrian Economic
Chamber, Division
Bank and Insurance
Aviation Working
Group
Bangkok Bank
The Banking
Association of South
Africa
Barclays
Basel Club Thailand
Berneunion
BMO Financial
Group
British Bankers
Association
British Property
Federation
Building Societies
Association (UK)
Bundesverband
deutscher Banken
Canadian Bankers
Association
China Banking
Association
Commercial Real
Estate Finance
Council
Credit Benchmark

Keys
1,2,3,4,5
2,3,4,6
1,2,5

1
✓

2

3

✓
✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4

✓

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4

✓

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4,5

✓

✓

✓

✓

1,2,4

✓

✓

1,3,5
1,2,4

✓
✓

1,2,3,4
1
n/a
1,2

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4

✓

✓

1,2

✓

✓

1,2,4

✓

✓

1,2,3,4,5

✓

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4

✓

✓

✓

✓

2,3

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

6
✓

✓

✓

✓

5
✓
✓

✓

3
1

4
✓
✓

✓
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22
23
24
25
26

27
28
29
30
31
32

33
34

35

36
37

38
39
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Credit Suisse
Customer Owned
Banking Association
Czech Banking
Association
Danish Bankers
Association et al
Danish Ministry of
Business and
Growth
Danmarks
Nationalbank
DBS Bank
Deutsche Bank
Deutsches
Aktieninstitut
Dutch Banking
Association
EU Federation for
the Factoring and
Commercial Finance
Industry
Eurofinas
European
Association of
Cooperative Banks
European
Association of
Public Banks
European Banking
Federation
European
Community
Shipowners
Association
European Federation
ofBuilding Societies
European Mortgage
Federation–
European Covered
Bond Council

1,3
6

✓
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✓
✓

n/a
1,2,3

✓

✓

✓

1,3

✓

1

✓

1,3
1,2,3
1,3

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

1,2,3,4,5

✓

✓

✓

1,3

✓

1,2
1,2,4,5

✓
✓

✓
✓

1,2,3

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4,5

✓

✓

✓

1

✓

1,2,3

✓

✓

✓

1,2

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
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40
41
42
43
44

45
46
47

48
49
50
51

52
53
54
55
56
57
58

59
60
61
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Federation of
German Industries
Finance Watch
Finanstilsynet and
Norges Bank
French Banking
Federation
GdW
Bundesverband dt.
Wohnungs– und
Immobilienunterneh
men
Genworth Financial
GFMA – ISDA –
IACPM – JFMC
Hong Kong
Association of
Banks
IBFed
ICC – BAFT
IIF
International Trade
and Forfaiting
Association
iRuiz Consulting
Italian Banking
Association
Japanese Bankers
Association
Leaseurope
Lloyds Banking
Group
Malayan Banking
Berhad
Nicholas CL Beale
and Michael B.
Thiessen
Rabo AgriFinance
Rabobank
Radley and
Associates

1
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✓

2,3,6
6

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4,5

✓

1

✓

n/a
1,2,3,4

✓

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4

✓

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4,5
1,3
1,2,3,4,5
n/a

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

1
1,2,3

✓
✓

✓

✓

1,2,3,4

✓

✓

✓

1,2,3
1,2

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

1,2,5

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓

n/a

1
1,2
1

✓

✓

✓
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62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
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Rail Working Group
Standard Chartered
Bank
State Street
Swedish Bankers
Association
The Clearing House
Tomasz Wersocki
U.S. Chamber of
Commerce
UBS
United Overseas
Bank Limited
World Council of
Credit Unions
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